steepholm: (Default)
[personal profile] steepholm
This is a question that has long bothered me, but not enough to research the answer.

Let's say you live in a country with strong libel or hate-speech laws. If you write, for example, "X is a racist", and X has the resources to take matters further, you may well find yourself on the wrong end of a libel suit.

But, there is no law against having particular beliefs or thoughts. You're still allowed to believe that X is a racist, even if you can't write "X is a racist" in a newspaper without getting sued.

So, what about writing the sentence "I believe that X is a racist"?

It's a factual statement, and the fact that it reports on is unactionable (because it's a belief, not a statement). So, why do I get the feeling that X might still sue, and win?

Or, if X wouldn't win, why don't people use the tactic of prepending "I believe" (or equivalent) to every otherwise-actionable statement all the time, like some legal version of Simon Says?

I assume this is a matter that has already been well trodden by lawyers, and maybe philosophers too (phrases like "use-mention distinction" and "performative language" are going through my head even now), but what conclusion have they come to?

(no subject)

Date: 2024-10-05 08:26 am (UTC)
greenwoodside: (Default)
From: [personal profile] greenwoodside
Hmm, interesting. I'm hitting the brakes before I fall down into an internet rabbit hole of more stuff I know nothing about.

But it does sound connected to the 2013 Defamation Act where one of the defences is 'honest opinion'. My impression is that in the UK, tagging a sentence with 'I believe' or 'I think' wouldn't impress the judges. They'd be more interested in whether the problematic utterance is factually provable or not. Wasserman vs Freilich

Somewhat relevant blog entry.

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